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There has been a considerable amount of work on uncertainty in 
knowledge-based systems. This work has generally been concerned with 
uncertainty arising from the strength of inferences and the weighting of 
evidence. In this paper, we discuss another type of uncertainty: that which is 
due to imprecision in the underlying .pnmitives used to represent the 
knowledge of the system. In particular, a given word may denote many 
similar but not identical entitles. Such words are said to be lexically 
imprecise. . · 
Lexical imprecision has caused widespread· problems in many areas. 
Unless this plienomenon is recognized and appropriately handled, it can 
degrade the performance of knowledge-based systems. IIi particular, it can 
leaa to difficulties with the user inter:face, and with the inferencing processes 
of these systems. Some techniques are suggested for coping with this 
phenomenon. 
INTRODUCTION: LEXICAL IMPRECISION 
Specialized fields of knowledge can be viewed as having their own 
languages. These languages� which are subsets of natural language, are known as "sublanguages" f61. Typically, sublanguages have a specialized 
vocabulary: for example, the vocabulary of medicine as found in a medical 
dictionary, or the vocabulary of law as found in a legal dictionary. 
Since sublanguages are generally used in complex situations where there 
are difficult problems to be solved, and critical aecisions to be made, it is 
important that the underlying vocabularies be well defined. In particular, the 
words need to have precise meanings. Oearly, if a given word does not have 
a precise meaning, then a sentence containing that word may be imprecise as 
well. If the sentence was intended to convey information relevant to the 
solution of a problem, then the imprecision might well lead to an incorrect 
solution. 
Unfortunately, the vocabularies underlying most sub languages are much 
less well defined than is commonly believed. For example, a word may be 
used to denote many similar, but not identical phenomena: In a recent 
review of the medical literature [4] we found more than a dozen definitions 
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for the important clinical phenomenon "pulsus paradoxus." All the 
definitions were intended to denote the same phenomenon. Yet they differed 
· enough that two physicians, given the same patient, could reach opP.osite 
conclUsions as to the presence or absence of a paradoxical pulse. We Will say 
that words which have several similar, but not identiCal, meanings are 
"lexically imprecise." 
The lexiCal imJ?recision to be found in medical terminology is not limited 
to certain exce�t10nal words, but is, in fact, extremely common. For 
example, given that a patient has produced only 300 ml of urine during the 
past day' nearly every rhysician would state that the patient has oliguria (low 
urine output). But, i the the physicians were also told that the patient 
weighs 8(J pounds, has received no fluids in the past 24 hours, and has been 
exercising heavily, then some would say that the patient is not oliguric, w bile 
others would continue to state that the patient has oliguria, albeit "to be 
ex�ed under the circumstances." Oliguria is a term tliat is well-known to 
all physicians, but it is apparent that the use of the word is highly dependent 
upon who is using the word, under what circumstance, and so forth. A 
s11nilar analysis can be performed for many other clinical entities, e.g., 
h�rtension, etc. 
It should be noted that we are not concerned here with words that are 
used to denote inherently imprecise entities. For example, the word 
"lethargic" must be somewliat imprecise because lethargy is very subjective in 
nature. However, we are extremely concerned with words that are used to 
denote ostensibly objective entities. The word "oliguria" can cause �roblems 
because although it is not well defined, nearly all physicians believe that it is. 
The word "letJ:iargy," on the other hand, is much less likely to cause difficulty 
because physicians recognize that it is subjective. 
LexiCal imprecision is more than just a theoretical curiousity: it has, in 
fact, caused widespread difficulties in medicine and other fields. For 
example, "There are varying schools of thought among specialists in 
interpreting retit mal seizures. Some assign the aesignation petit mal to 3 
�ercent of al forms of epilepsy; others classify 80 percent of seizures under 
this rubric . . . . In three recent papers, the results reported by the authors on a 
newly introduced anti-epileptic drug for the treatment of petit mal were 
respectively that it was highly effective, moderately effective, and ineffective. 
How much of this discrepancy is to be attributed to the drug or conditions of 
the trials, and how much to the different conditions regarded by the 
experiments as being petit mal?" [5]. 
EFFECTS ON KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 
One of the fundamental choices to be made in the construction of a 
knowledge-based system is the selection of an appropriate knowledge 
representation. Although rule-based representations are currently the most 
common choice, there are many other options, e.g., frames, semantic nets, 
scripts, etc. · 
.At some �int1 however, all knowledge representations require a choice 
of semantic primitives. These primitives are the fundamental o5jects which a 
system will manipulate. In a: knowledge-based system designed to perform 
medical diagnosis, for example, the semantic primitives would be various 
si�ns, symptoms, lab values, and diagnoses. Note that the semantic 
pnmitives are generally either lexical items (words), or numbers. 
Consider a system which, when given some collection of signs and 
symptoms, deduces the patient's disease state. Call the set of all signs and 
symptoms S,. the set of all subsets of S (power set of S) P(S), and the set of 
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all diseases D. Then diagnosis can be viewed as a function from P(S) to D; 
i.e., F:P(S)-D. For the sake of argument, it is assumed here that each patient 
has one and only one disease. Furthermore, it is assumed that the diagnostic 
function is provtded by a single domain expert. 
Suppose, now, that a user makes a certain set of observations 0 about a 
patient. In order to use the diagnostic system, the user will need to express 
these observations in terms of the semantic primitives of the system. In 
other words, 0 must be mapped by the user into P(S). Therefore, the 
computer-assisted diagnostic process is actually 0-P(S)-!J. 
Unfortunately, due to lexical imprecision, two mdividuals may map the 
same observations differently. This can, in turn, lead to a ·different set of 
deductions by the system. For example, suppose that an expert creates the 
following system: 
IF pulsus-paradoxus 
THEN tamponade-likely 
ELSE tamponade-not-likely 
Also, suppose that user U1 defines pulsus paradoxus as an inspiratory decline 
in systolic arterial pressure of 10 mm Hg or more, and user U2 defines it as a 
decline of 13 or more. If a patient has an inspiratory decline of 12, then Ul 
would map his observation into the semantic primitive pulsus-paradoxus, but 
U2 would not. Therefore, the system would provide U1 with the conclusion 
that tamponade is likely, but would provide U2 with the opposite conclusion. 
Certainly, both conclusions cannot be correct. The difference in 
conclusions is due to the fact that the map 0-P(S) is not uniquely specified. 
li} particular, this map varies from individual to mdividual, depeni:iing on the 
definitions that each person happens to use. 
If a system is constructed oy two or more domain experts, then lexical 
imprecision can lead to less than optimal performance of the diagnostic 
function F:P(S)-D. Suppose, for example, that expert E1 provides the rule 
IF A UffiN .8, and expert E2 provides the rule IF B THEN C. Given A, the 
system will deduce C. But this may be incorrect if Eland E2 have different 
definitions for the semantic primitive B. Of course, if a given expert is able 
to provide correct solutions to problems, then his knowledge must be, in 
some sense, internally consistent. The problem here, is that the components 
of his knowledge may be inconsistent wtth the components of another expert. 
LEXICAL IMPRECISION IS NOT LEXICAL AMBIGUITY 
Many words have several distinct meanings. For examJ?le, the word 
"beat" can be used as a verb to denote the act of physically abusmg someone, 
as a verb to denote the act of sailing a boat close to the wind, as a noun to 
denote a policeman's patrol area, and so forth. This phenomenon of multiple 
distinct meanings is referred to as "lexical ambiguity." Note that lextcal 
ambiguity is not the same thing as lexical imprecisiOn. A useful analogy is 
the following: If you open a dictionary and choose a word, it will have 
several distinct definitions. This is lexical ambiguity. If you open two 
dictionaries and choose the same word you will find sets of very similar, but 
not identical definitions. This is lexical tmprecision. 
Lexical ambiguity can lead to difficulties in the processing of natural 
language by computer. From a syntactic standpoint, the possibility that a 
given word may have multiple meanings makes it necessary to select the 
correct part-of-speech for the word. For example, in parsing the sentence 
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"He is on his beat," it must be determined that "beat" is being used as a noun, 
and not as a verb. Since the meanings of a lexically imprecise word are all 
the same part-of-speech, lexical imprecision does not lead to problems in 
pars
Le
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Semantic analysis requires that the correct word-sense of an item be selected. 
For example, in analyzing the sentence fragment "Beat until you see the 
buoy," it must be determined that "beat" refers to the action of sailing close 
to the wind, and not to the infliction of physical violence. The diction� of 
a typical natural language processing system may contain multiple definitions 
for a gjven word, but tllese definitions are invariably distinct. Hence, lexical 
imprecision has not posed many problems for semantic analysis. 
It is at the level of pragmatics that lexical imprecision will cause the most 
difficulty for systems that use natural language. While subtle distinctions in 
meaning are of little consequence in the syntactic and semantic decomposition 
of sentences, these same distinctions can have profound consequences on a 
system that attempts to use those sentences. 
There is much discussion in the Artificial Intelligence literature of 
techniques for handling_ lexical ambiguity. Birnbaum [2 1 provides a detailed 
review and analysis. On the other hand, there seems to be little, if any, 
discussion of methods for coping with lexical imprecision. The following 
section contains some preliminary suggestions. 
COPING WITH LEXICAL IMPRECISION 
The ideal solution to the problem of lexical imprecision would be to 
eliminate it entirely. This would require that a precise set of definitions be 
established in each sQ_ecialized fiefd of knowledge -- presumably by a 
committee of ex�rts. Furthermore, every individual in that field would need 
.to agree upon and use those definitions. There has been, in fact, a great deal 
of effort m this direction, but with only mixed results. A notable success is 
the science of chemistry: once a molecule's structure has been determined, 
that substance has a name assigned to it that conveys the same meaning to 
every chemist. In the field of medicine, such efforts have been much less 
successful. For example, the American College of Cardiology, and the 
American Heart Assoaation have published what they feel to be a standard 
definition for pulsus paradoxus [1], yet this definition was not to be found in 
any of the more than sixty papers m the literature that we surveyed [ 41. 
Although these efforts to standardize terminology are extremely 
important, it will never be possible to completely eliminate lexical 
imprecision. As a field of knowledge expands, new discoveries are made, 
new measurement techniques devisecf, and entities are viewed at finer levels 
of &ranularity. This in turn renders some previously P,recise words less 
prease. For example, to characterize a patient as being hypertensive" was 
actually quite prease a hundred years ago; but in modern medicine, such a 
charactenzation is far from ad�uate. Lexical imprecision is, and will remain, 
a ubiquitous phenomenon, and high performance knowledge-based systems 
will need to handle it in a reasonable fashion. 
As was discussed previously, lexical imprecision can lead to difficulties 
both at the interface to a knowledge-based system, i.e., 0-P(S), and within 
the system, i.e., P(S)-D. There are several ways to lessen the Impact at the 
interface level. Orie way is to eliminate that level as much as possible. In 
particular, the mo�e <;>bsledations that a system can make di�ectlv (rather than 
through a human mterm iary), the less the damage that Will be done due to 
indivioual differences i� the mapping 0-P(S). Iri some situations a system 
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should be able to gather most of its input directly: for instance, monitoring a 
chemical plant. Irl many other situations, h9wever, a human intermediary is 
essential. For example, computer vision and robotics notwithstanding, no 
machine is yet capable of performing a complete physical examination of a 
patient. 
Problems at the interface level can also be decreased by insisting on 
Quantification. For example, the question "Does patient have ol�una'?·· ts 
highly susceptible to individual differences in the mapping 0-PlS), but a 
r�uest for the volume of urine output is much less problematical [3). 
Urifortunately, not all phenomena can be quantified-- e.g., petit mal. Even 
for those phenomena which can be quantified, there are still _potential 
difficulties to be aware of. For example, the normal ranges of various 
biomedical tests, e.g., enzyme assays, are not standardized, but actually vary 
from laboratory to faboratory. 
Another consideration is that it must be certain that all observers are in 
fact measuring the same phenomenon (e.g., is pulsus paradoxus the 
inspiratory decrease in pulse pressure, or the mspiratory decrease in systolic 
pressure?). This could be encouraged as follows: when the system requests 
the value of an entity, it also provides a definition. For example, "Please 
input the measured value of pufsus paraaoxus (inspiratory decline in systolic 
arterial pressure)." Of course, these definitions would need to be built into 
the system. 
The incorporation of definitions into a system is also a potential solution 
to problems in the construction of the diagnostic functiOn P(S)-D. In 
particular, each expert could be encouraged to record his definitions for the 
semantic primitives with which he is working. Thus if expert El produces 
the rule A -> B, he would be expected to provide definitions for the 
primitives A and B. Before expert E2 entered tlie rule B -> C, he would be 
expected to check the definition of B, and so forth. 
Unfortunately, it may be unreasonable to ex_pect that definitions be 
provided for all the prirrutives of a large system. The demands in terms of 
mcreased development time and overhead could be enormous; nor is it clear 
how such defmitions could be incorporated into existing systems. 
Furthermore, since the definitions of primitives are themselves composed 
from other primitives, it is impossible to enforce the complete consistency of 
the definitions within a Istem. Fuzzy set theory [7 has some applicability as a tool to handle lexical imprecision. Many wor s are lexically Imprecise because they are based upon 
cutoffs. For example the lexical imprecision of "pulsus paradoxus" stems 
largely from the fact that different experts use different cutoffs, e.g., 10, 13, 
etc. These cutoffs in tum lead to discontinuous behavior, e.g., pulsus 
paradoxus is considered to be present given a cutoff of 10 but absent gtven a 
cutoff of 13. By modeling pulsus paradoxus as a fuzzy concept, the damaging 
effects of lexiccil imprecision could be greatly reduced because the presence or 
absence of pulsus would no longer be treated in a dis�ntinuous fashion. 
Note, however, that fuzzy techniques are not a solution for all cases of 
lexical imprecision. For example, fuzzy techniques could not reconcile the 
imprecision due to one observer measuring the decrease in pulse pressure, 
and another another observer measuring the decrease in systolic pressure. 
SUMMARY 
Uncertainty is a major source of difficulty in the construction and use 
of knowledge-based systems. One type of uncertainty arises from the 
strength of the implication operator in mferences such as A -> B: e.g., if A 
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then there is a 40% chance of B. Another type of uncertainty arises from the 
weighting of evidence: e.g., there is a 70% chance that the patient has A. In 
this paper, we have discussed another type of \incertainty --that which is due 
to imprecision in the underlying pnmitives: e.g., two experts have a 
different conception of A. 
Lexical imprecision can degrade the performance of knowledge-based 
systems. Effects can surface at both the user interface and inferencing levels. 
Among the techniques to handle lexical imprecision are the direct 
acquisition of input data, quantification, the inclusion of definitions, and 
fuzzy set methods. Current[}: we are examining ways of incorporating these 
techiliques into medical knowledge-based systems. 
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